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Abstract
Using a panel of ve Asian economies - Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Thai-
land - over the period 1995{2007 we analyze the links between rm survival and nancial
development. We nd that traditionally used measures of nancial development play an im-
portant role in inuencing rm survival. When stock markets become larger or more liquid
rms' survival chances improve. On the contrary, we show that higher levels of nancial
intermediation can increase rm failures. We also nd that the benecial eects of stock
market development are more pronounced during the later years of our sample, while the
adverse eects of bank intermediation have declined over time. Finally, large rms are more
likely to benet from developments in nancial markets compared to small rms.
JEL classi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1. Introduction
Does it matter for rm survival whether a country's nancial system is more or less
developed? The idea that the nancial system has a central role to play in economic uctu-
ations is an old one (see Gertler (1988)). Following the seminal work of Goldsmith (1969),
several empirical studies have documented the existence of a strong positive link between the
functioning of the nancial system and various aspects of economic activity such as invest-
ment, employment and economic growth (see for instance, King and Levine (1993); Rajan
and Zingales (1998) and Levine (2006)). These studies, however, remain largely silent about
the role of nancial development in rms' survival prospects. Such evidence is important
for understanding the mechanism by which nancial development aects survival and can
better inform policy makers, especially in the context of emerging Asian economies that are
undergoing periods of deregulation and redesign (see Hasan et al. (2009)).
The purpose of this paper is to provide, for the rst time a systematic empirical anal-
ysis of the impact of nancial development on rm survival by looking at the direct eect
of nancial development indicators on rm survival after controlling for rm, industry and
macroeconomic eects. Our empirical approach focuses on two of the most important aspects
of nancial development - banking development and stock market development. The moti-
vation to do so stems from two important considerations. First, in the Asian region banks
dominated the nancial markets for many years, but recently Asian economies have become
less bank centered and large strides were taken to develop equity and bond markets. Second,
emerging East Asian economies are characterized by a highly volatile environment and high
risk of bankruptcy making therefore the analysis of corporate failures very relevant.1 To
this end, we analyze the survival prospects of 2,892 listed rms from ve Asian economies
(Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand) that experienced signicant failure
1Compared to Western economies, emerging Asian countries experience signicantly higher corporate
failure rates: according to our dataset, failure rates in Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand
are respectively 9%, 9%, 10%, 6% and 15%, compared to only 1.5% in the UK (Bridges and Guariglia (2008)
and Gorg and Spaliara (2009)).
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rates over the last decade.
Corporate failures can be aected directly by the development of the nancial system for
a number of reasons. To begin with equity markets, at higher levels of equity development
corporate failures should be reduced. Larger equity markets with greater liquidity reduce
investment risk and the cost of accessing the paper market thereby providing a workable
alternative to meet rms' external funding requirements.2 Therefore, gaining access to an
alternative source for external nancing can shield rms against failures, particularly when
banks decide to interrupt lines of credit. Moving to banking development, increased levels
of bank lending might adversely aect rm survival since emerging Asian markets are inher-
ent to bank runs and therefore higher levels of banking intermediation could impede rms'
performance and survival prospects. Furman and Stiglitz (1998) suggest that Asia's depen-
dence on banks was important for the 1997-98 nancial crisis, while Beck et al. (2006) show
that nancial intermediary development can magnify the impact of macroeconomic shocks if
there is limited access to external nancial markets.3 In our paper we also recognize that the
eect of institutional development on rm failures has evolved over time due to recent East
Asian eorts to strengthen their nancial markets. In addition, growth in stock markets and
banks may not inuence all rms in the same way. Therefore, we allow for the fact that
rms of dierent sizes might respond to the growth of equity size, liquidity and banking
intermediation dierently.
The value added of the present paper is threefold. First, we consider a direct role for
nancial development in inuencing business failures. In addition to the rm-specic and
nancial indicators previously considered(i.e leverage, prots, collateral, size and age), this
study also considers the impact of dierent measures of nancial development. This approach
complements the existing empirical and theoretical literature on rm survival and borrow-
ing constraints (see Zingales (1998); Bunn and Redwood (2003); Clementi and Hopenhayn
2If there is a large volume of trading, it may be possible for brokers to spread their xed costs more
widely and thus reduce transactions costs.
3The issue of economic growth, macroeconomic shocks and banking systems is highlighted in Hasan et al.
(2009) and Dovern et al. (2010).
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(2006); Farinha and Santos (2006); Bridges and Guariglia (2008) and Gorg and Spaliara
(2009)), which highlights the role of nancial condition in rm survival.
The second main contribution of the paper is that, using comparable multi-country data
made up by rm-level panels, we are able to assess whether the nancial development-survival
nexus has changed over time since the recent developments in the Asian nancial markets.
The nancial system in Asia has undergone signicant changes and developments over the
past decade and it may be possible that the role of nancial development in rm survival has
become more (or less) pronounced. The most prominent initiative towards the development
of a regional nancial market has been the establishment of the Asian Bond Fund, which
was initiated in 2003 and extended in 2005.
Finally, we are able to identify which rms are more likely to benet from the nancial
development with respect to corporate failures. Intuitively, we do not expect all rms to be
equally aected by nancial development since large rms are able to tap nancial markets,
while small rms are more likely to be nancially constrained and may be unable to access
nancial services due to signicant xed costs. Thus, large rms may be better equipped
to take advantage of developments in nancial markets and consequently improve their per-
formance. Attempts to identify groups of companies that are nancially constrained using
criteria such as the rm size (Carpenter and Guariglia (2008) and Spaliara (2009)) or rm
age (Guariglia (2008) and Spaliara (2009)) have been found to play an important role in
various aspects of rm behavior (e.g investment and employment). Bridges and Guariglia
(2008) found that nancial constraints are important in rm survival but their eect can be
mitigated with global engagement. In this paper we will test whether there is a dierential
eect of nancial development indicators on the failure probabilities of small and large rms.
The remainder of the paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 illustrates the baseline
specication and econometric methodology. In Section 3 we describe our data and provide
some summary statistics. Section 4 presents the empirical evidence. In section 5 we check
the robustness of our ndings. Section 6 concludes the paper.
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2. Empirical methodology and baseline specication
We use the theoretical analysis by Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006) as a starting point
for our empirical analysis. In their model borrowing constraints aect rm survival and this
generates a role for capital structure in an asymmetric information setup. In our empirical
analysis we take on board these predictions and we also consider the eects of nancial
development on rm survival. In order to establish whether nancial development changes
rms' survival prospects, we model the determinants of rm survival and check whether
the indicators of nancial development are statistically signicant determinants of rms'
hazard of failure. We dene a rm as failed in a given year when its company status
is that of dead.4 Following the recent literature on rm survival (for example Gorg and
Spaliara (2009) and Gorg and Bandick (2010)) our empirical models are estimated with the
complementary log-log model (cloglog) which is equivalent to the discrete time version of
the proportional hazard model. Given that our data are collected on a yearly basis, the
cloglog model is more appropriate compared to the Cox model.5 Estimating the models
with the proportional hazard model will allow us to capture the exact time of failure and
the potential right censoring bias. The baseline proportional hazard of a rm failing at time
t is formulated as:
h(t) = h0(t)exp(
0FD + 0X + 0Y + 0Z) (1)
where h(t) is the rate at which rms fail at time t given that they have survived in t  1,
for a given number of covariates. h0(t) is the baseline hazard function at time t when all of
the covariates are set to zero. To test whether rm exit is aected by country-level nancial
development, we include the term FD, which denotes the vector of nancial development
4The Thomson Financial database reports rms as `dead' but it does not distinguish whether rms in
liquidation or receivership are included in this category. However, to ensure that the denition of `dead'
rms does not include takeovers we have employed the Zephyr database. Details on the construction of our
dependent variable are provided in the next section. Also note that we use the terms failure and survival
interchangeably.
5In addition, the cloglog model has the same assumptions on the coecient vector a^, which denotes failure
times, as the continuous-time version of the proportional hazard model (Prentice and Gloeckler (1978)).
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measures such as stock market size (Market Capitalization), the liquidity of the stock market
(Stock Market Value Traded), the size of the banking system (Private Bank Credit) and the
importance of deposit-money banks (Bank Assets), respectively. X comprises a vector of
nancial variables assumed to capture the eect of nancial health on the likelihood of
survival. Y is a vector of rm-specic, industry-specic characteristics and macroeconomic
control variables. Lastly, Z is a set of industry dummies (calculated at the 4-digit level) that
control for xed eects across industries and country dummies accounting for institutional
dierences between countries.
To incorporate a role for nance in the survival model, as suggested by the theoretical
model of Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006), vector X considers three dimensions of nancial
health from the balance sheet, namely leverage, protability and collateral assets.6 We
dene leverage (LEV ERAGE), as total debt over total assets, to measure the rm's overall
indebtedness. Higher levels of existing debt are often associated with a poorer balance
sheet, and thus rms with higher levels of debt face greater diculties obtaining funds on
the markets (see Zingales (1998) and Bougheas et al. (2006)). We expect therefore a positive
relationship between leverage and the probability of failure.
The protability ratio (PROFITABILITY ) is dened as earnings before interest and
taxes relative to total assets to measure a rm's ability to generate prots. It is widely
recognized that internal funds can serve as a buer to absorb unexpected losses, reducing
the probability of insolvency and, therefore, the expected bankruptcy cost (see Bunn and
Redwood (2003); Bridges and Guariglia (2008) and Gorg and Spaliara (2009)). We therefore
expect to nd protability to decrease the probability of failure.
Collateral (COLLATERAL) is dened as tangible assets over total assets and proxies for
the rm's ability to pledge collateral for external nance. In the survival literature, access to
collateral assets is very important since Farinha and Santos (2006) and Bridges and Guariglia
(2008) document that rms with a larger fraction of tangibles in their balance sheets are
6Our rm-specic nancial indicators are lagged one period to mitigate potential endogeneity concerns
and have been deated using the GDP deator for the relevant country.
5
more likely to survive. Thus, we expect rms with a high collateral ratio to experience lower
probabilities of failure.
Vector Y includes a choice of control variables guided by the existing empirical literature
on the determinants of rm survival. According to Geroski (1995), a rm's size plays an
important role in determining rm failures. Small rms tend to be associated with the higher
degree of information asymmetry and therefore are more at risk of failure than large rms
(Dunne et al. (1998) and Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006)). Accordingly, we include rm
size (SIZE) dened as the logarithm of the rm's real total assets. We also incorporate
its square (SIZE2) to allow for non-linearities. Further, we introduce age (AGE) which
measures the number of years a rm has been listed on the stock exchange, and AGE2 to
control for nonlinear eects. Firms with an established track record are less likely to fail
than those that are younger because they are usually more able to withstand past economic
and nancial downturns and therefore face a smaller liquidation risk. This would be the case
both for domestic and multinational rms as noted by Gorg and Strobl (2002).
In vector Y we also control for the macroeconomic and industry-specic conditions by
adding the GDP growth and the minimum ecient scale of the industry (MES). It should be
noted that without controlling for GDP growth the impact of nancial development on sur-
vival might simply reect overall development and not something specic about the nancial
system. We add therefore the GDP growth to control for the macroeconomic environment
and demand factors in particular and we expect it to be negatively associated with the rm's
probability to fail.7 To control for the extent of economies of scale in the industry, we add
MES measured as the log of median output in each sector of the economy. There is a con-
sensus that attaining minimum ecient scale raises a rm's survival prospects (Audretsch
(1991)) and therefore we expect a negative relationship between MES and corporate failures.
7To check the robustness of our results we replaced GDP growth with the exchange rate, which measures
the exchange rate environment. Our results, not reported here for brevity, remain unaected. As an
additional test we have added time dummies to our models in order to control explicitly for business cycle
eects. The results are robust to this modication but due to space considerations are omitted.
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3. Data and summary statistics
The data for this paper are drawn from dierent sources including Thomson Financial
Primark, Zephyr, the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank. These are combined in
a new way to cast light on the eect of nancial development on the probability of failure in
the Asian region. The data cover rms in ve emerging Asian economies - Indonesia, Korea,
Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand - over the period 1995-2007.8
3.1. Firm-level data
The Thomson Financial Primark database oers balance sheet and prot and loss ac-
counts data for rms in the East Asian region. Our initial data set includes a total of 41,641
annual observations on 4,651 listed companies. We provide information on nancial accounts
and ratios for Asian rms operating in all sectors of the economy for the years 1995-2007.
We use Zephyr, which is distributed by Bureau Van Dijk, to obtain data on mergers and
acquisitions for the sampled rms. The Thomson Financial Primark database reports rms
as `dead' but it may be possible that some rms could be recorded as `dead' not because
they failed but because they merged with another rm instead. Employing Zephyr we are
able to identify and drop those rms that are mistakenly coded as `dead' in our data. This
will ensure that our dependent variable has been accurately constructed to capture rms
that failed and did not exit the sample due to mergers and acquisitions.
Following normal selection criteria used in the literature, we exclude companies that did
not have complete records for all explanatory variables and rm-years with negative sales.
To control for the potential inuence of outliers, we exclude observations in the 0.5 percent
from upper and lower tails of the distribution of the regression variables. In addition, by
allowing for both entry and exit, the panel has an unbalanced structure which helps mitigate
potential selection and survivor bias. Our sample contains data for 358 rms in Indonesia,
917 in Korea, 871 in Malaysia, 596 in Singapore and 530 in Thailand, a total of 3,272
8We have also attempted to remove 2007 from our sample due to the fact that it may contain some early
eects of the recent global nancial crisis. The results, which are available upon request, remain unchanged.
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rms. Of these rms, 2,892 are listed on the stock exchange (88.4%) and 380 are unlisted
(11.6%). However, due to the fact that our empirical models include the AGE variable,
which measures the number of years a rm has been listed on the stock exchange, only listed
rms are included in the estimations. Thus our nal panel includes 2,892 rms for ve Asian
economies. Our sample can be considered as representative of the broader aggregate in terms
of the population of listed rms. Figure 1 compares the number of listed companies in our
data with those reported in the World Bank database (WDI). We observe that our sample
tracks very well the corresponding aggregate gure and therefore our sample is an accurate
reection of the universe of listed Asian companies. Finally, we note that both lines show an
upward trend which is consistent with the view that stock markets have become increasingly
important in Asia over the last decade.
3.2. Indicators of nancial development
Data on nancial development indicators are taken from the World Development Indica-
tors (WDI, November 2008 version), described in Beck et al. (2003). Annual data on GDP
growth come from the Asian Development Bank. In line with the literature on nancial
development we use various aggregate indicators that proxy for nancial development to
ensure robustness.9 We use two indicators to capture the development of the stock market,
which provides `arm's-length nance' (see Beck et al. (2000) and Levine (2006)). We rely on
both the size and the liquidity of the stock market. A larger market size (stock market cap-
italization/GDP) indicates that investors have condence in the market's ability to channel
funds into the most ecient projects. Greater market liquidity (total stock market value
traded/GDP) implies lower transactions costs and wider market participation.
We employ two indicators to measure nancial intermediary development. First, we
consider the quantity of funds that is channeled through the banking system to investors in
9In our main results we use annual values of nancial development indicators over the period 1995|2007
to avoid signicant informational loss. However, to address concerns regarding reverse causality we have
re-estimated our models using nancial development indicators in the initial year of our estimation period,
1995. The results, which are available upon request, are robust to this modication.
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the private sector (private bank credit/GDP). This indicator shows the overall development
in private banking system. According to Baltagi et al. (2008) this is the most important
banking development indicator because it quanties the extent to which new rms have
opportunities to obtain bank nance. Second, we look at the ratio of deposit-money bank
assets to GDP (bank assets/GDP). This indicator captures the overall size of the banking
sector (see King and Levine (1993)).
3.3. Descriptive statistics
Summary statistics for the rm-specic variables used in our empirical analysis are pro-
vided in Table 1. The gures are presented for all rms (column 1), those rms that failed
(column 2) and those that are survivors (column 3). A nal column reports the p-value of
a test for whether there is a signicant dierence between values for failing and surviving
rms. On the basis of three dierent nancial variables we nd that failing rms are more
leveraged, less protable and less collateralized compared to survivors. This supports the
notion put forward by a number of studies (see Zingales (1998); Bunn and Redwood (2003);
Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006); Farinha and Santos (2006); Bridges and Guariglia (2008)
and Gorg and Spaliara (2009)) that rms in bad nancial shape are more likely to fail. We
also observe that failing rms are smaller and younger than surviving rms. This is in line
with the previous empirical and theoretical research, which shows that the probability of
exit decreases with rm size and age (e.g Jovanovic (1982) and Clementi and Hopenhayn
(2006)). These dierences between sub-samples are statistically signicant in all cases.
Table 2 reports summary statistics for rm-specic and nancial variables by country.
We nd that rms in Singapore and Malaysia maintain the lowest levels of leverage and
the highest levels of protability. In addition, Korean and Singapore rms are the most
collateralized across the ve countries included in this study. Finally, Indonesian rms
display the largest values of size and Thai rms are older (i.e longer listed on the stock
exchange).
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The evolution of nancial development indicators over time is depicted in Figure 2.10
The upper panel refers to the indicators of stock market development, while the lower panel
to indicators of banking development. We observe a sharp decline for both stock market
indicators (market capitalization and market value traded) during the East Asian crisis in
1997-98, followed by a noticeably high growth in the post crisis period. Market capitalization
dropped substantially in 2002 but has grown rapidly after 2003. This signicant drop in 2002
may reect the aftermath of the stock market crash which was related to the dotcom bubble
bursting with primary adverse eects in the US stock exchange and secondary eects in
Asia and Europe. Market value traded has maintained levels between two and a half times
higher than values in 1997-98, and it is growing steadily over time. This indicates that stock
markets have become more liquid, which reects the greater diversity of investors and the
relative improvement in the trading environment due to faster settlement and more rapid
dissemination of information. Finally, the banking development indicators (private bank
credit and bank assets) remained at elevated levels during the crisis, followed by a sharp
decline in the subsequent years. Both indicators run up during the crisis and this was
reected in high leverage, or debt to equity in East Asian corporate sectors (see World Bank
(1999)). It is clear, however, that after the crisis both indicators have declined substantially,
which implies that Asian nancial systems are noticeably less bank centered in the later
years of our sample.
All four indicators of nancial development are summarized across countries in Table 3.
The data reveal clear heterogeneity in nancial development of the ve economies used in
this study. For instance, the average lowest values of stock market size and liquidity are
shown for Indonesia. Malaysia and Singapore have the largest stock market capitalization,
while Korea has the most liquid stock market followed by Singapore. According to Eichen-
green (2004), the stock market is important in these economies because the authorities have
aggressively promoted its development. With respect to the development of the banking sys-
10These gures refer to the ve economies included in the present study.
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tem, we observe that bank intermediation is especially important in Malaysia and Thailand.
Finally, Singapore experience the lowest average failure rate, while Malaysia and Thailand
are characterized by the highest failure rates. Taken together these gures suggest that more
market-oriented economies such as Singapore experience the lowest failure rates, while more
bank-based economies, such as Thailand experience the highest failure rates.
It remains to be seen, though, whether these preliminary ndings continue to hold when
we control for a number of factors which are known to play a role in rms' survival studies.
In the sections that follow we test within a formal regression analysis framework whether
nancial development has a statistically signicant inuence on rms' survival prospects.
4. Results
4.1. Financial development and rm survival
We begin our enquiry with a baseline model of business failure as shown in Equation (1).
The probability of corporate failure is modeled as a function of the country-level nancial
development indicators, the rm-specic control variables, nancial variables, industry char-
acteristics and macroeconomic conditions. The predicted probability of exit, evaluated at
the mean of the independent variables is 9.5%, which is close to the actual exit rates across
countries reported in the summary statistics.
Table 4 reports results for the baseline model, where the nancial development indicators
are used one by one in successive columns (1, 2, 3 and 4). The point estimates on measures
of nancial development suggest a robust relationship between rm survival and the devel-
opment of the nancial system. In columns 1 and 2 the coecients on stock market size
(Market Capitalization) and liquidity (Market V alue Traded) are negative and signicant
suggesting that larger and more ecient stock markets would reduce the incidence of business
failures. These results suggest that in economies with more developed stock markets rms are
able to hedge, pool risk, and access an alternative source of external nancing, raising their
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survival chances.11 The relationship between stock market development and rm survival is
not only statistically, but also economically important. To illustrate the eect let us consider
the coecient on market capitalization as shown in column 1 of Table 4. Moving from the
25th percentile of the distribution of market capitalization (41.2%) to the 50th percentile
(88%) would increase rms' survival chances by 17.8 percentage points.12 Therefore, moving
to a market-based system would provide the means to free Asian economies from excessive
dependence on banking intermediation and to foster the development of a more diversied
and ecient nancial sector. In addition, market-based economies are better in allocating
resources to investment projects that promise the highest returns and therefore are able to
facilitate more productive long-term investments (Levine (1991)). Finally, market-oriented
systems are better in reducing asymmetric information (Hermes and Lensink (2000)). This
may be due to the engagement of international rating agencies and local agencies, which can
reduce information asymmetry in the capital markets.
Moving to the banking development indicators, we observe that the coecients on both
Private Bank Credit and Bank Assets, which are shown in columns 3 and 4 respectively,
are positive and signicant at the one percent level. To assess the economic importance
of banking development let us focus on the coecient on private bank credit as shown
in column 3 of Table 4. Moving from the 25th percentile of the distribution of private
bank credit (84%) to the 50th percentile (101%) would result into 19.7 percentage points
higher chance of corporate failure. These ndings suggest that rms' chances of failure
are increasing in nancial intermediary development. There are strong reasons to believe
that increasing bank intermediation can lead to failures. The relatively short maturity of
most bank loans means that a macroeconomic shock can generate a source of endogenous
fragility due to the asset-liability mismatch. This may leave Asian corporations vulnerable
11As already noted, when nancial markets develop both in terms of size and liquidity, it may be possible
for brokers to spread their xed costs more widely and thus reduce the thresholds that bar rms' entry to
nancial markets.
12This is calculated as follows: ln(88)-ln(41.2)=0.75 and 0.75*(-0.238)=-0.178, where -0.238 is the coe-
cient on stock market capitalization in the cross-country regressions.
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to a disruptive credit crunch and the depreciation of the exchange rate can cause serious
balance-sheet damage, in the worst case leading highly leveraged rms into bankruptcy.13
The vulnerability of corporations to this position was highlighted with the onset of the
Asian crisis. When the crisis occurred the funding to banks and then to corporates fell
dramatically, and in the absence of alternative sources of nance for rms and banks, the
real eects of the crisis were amplied.14 Further, Rajan (1992) presents the costs of bank
nancing in a theoretical setup. Based on the model's predictions, banks can extract rent
from rms' investment projects, thus reducing the payo that accrues to the rms and
consequently reducing their eorts to undertake innovative activities. In turn, the literature
on rm survival (see Audretsch and Mahmood (1995)) shows that less innovative rms are
unable to establish and maintain a competitive advantage in the market and thus they
are more likely to fail. In addition, Farinha and Santos (2006) show that higher levels
of bank debt are more likely to increase the incidence of corporate failures. Finally, the
negative association between bank intermediation and rm survival is also related to previous
empirical ndings in the nance{growth literature. For example, Guariglia and Poncet
(2008) nd a negative association between nance and growth in China, while Beck et al.
(2006) provide evidence of a magnifying role of nancial intermediaries in the propagation
of macroeconomic shocks in economies where rms have limited access to external nance.
Consistent with this view De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995) nd a robust negative relationship
between nancial intermediation and growth in Latin American economies. The upshot
is that more nancial intermediation in emerging markets is often a sign of fragile and
overleveraged nancial systems, especially when these economies are exposed to extreme
economic conditions.
Firm-specic nancial indicators have the expected impact on rms' failure. In particu-
13This implication is consistent with Furman and Stiglitz (1998) as discussed in Eichengreen (2004).
14The most severe experiences were in those countries with the most highly leveraged companies prior to
the crisis { Indonesia, Korea and Thailand. Much of the corporate debt was foreign currency denominated
therefore the reversal of capital inows with the subsequent depreciation of the exchange rate had a sharp
adverse eect on investment and output.
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lar, rms with high levels of LEV ERAGE face higher probabilities of failure compared to
those with low leverage conrming previous reported empirical evidence (Zingales (1998);
Farinha and Santos (2006); Bridges and Guariglia (2008) and Gorg and Spaliara (2009)).
High levels of debt would increase moral hazard and adverse selection problems, and would
lead to a higher probability of failure. PROFITABILITY enters with the expected neg-
ative sign implying that an increase in protability ratio lowers the hazard of failure. This
result is consistent with previous ndings that more protable rms are less likely to fail (
Bunn and Redwood (2003); Bridges and Guariglia (2008) and Gorg and Spaliara (2009)).
The coecient on COLLATERAL attracts the expected negative sign and it has a highly
signicant impact on rms' failure prospects. Firms with high levels of tangible assets are
able to pledge collateral and to obtain more external funding but also to pursue risk-shifting
strategies (Bridges and Guariglia (2008) and Farinha and Santos (2006)).
With respect to our rm-specic controls, the coecients on SIZE and SIZE2 enter
with the expected signs but only the latter is signicant. The coecients on rm AGE exert
a negative and signicant impact on failure and this nding is in line with previous theoretical
and empirical evidence which shows that failure rates decrease with the rm's track record
(e.g Jovanovic (1982) and Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006)). Finally, the coecients on
AGE2 are positive and signicant suggesting signicant non-linearities.
The results on the MES and the GDP growth (GDP ) behave as conjectured. Firms
operating in industries with high MES are more likely to survive, which is consistent with
Audretsch (1991), whereas improved economic conditions reduce the probability of failures
in line with Alvarez and Gorg (2009).
4.2. Evolution over time
Having identied a direct relationship between nancial development and rm survival,
we now explore whether this linkage has evolved over time. Asian countries have sought
to increase nancial market development to avoid dependence on foreign capital as was the
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case in the 1990s around the time of the 1997-98 Asian crisis. In the post-crisis period,
East Asian economies established a working group on nancial market development and the
priority was given to the development of stock and bond markets. This would provide the
means to free Asian economies from excessive dependence on bank intermediation and to
foster the development of a more diversied and ecient nancial sector. Large strides have
since been taken to improve the capital markets at the country and regional level. Perhaps
the most prominent initiative has been the move towards a regional bond market with the
establishment of the Asian Bond Fund, referred to as the ABF, in 2003 to purchase dollar
denominated Asian government bond issues. This initiative was then extended in 2005, to
an open fund with purchases of local currency government bond issues. It is therefore of
primary interest to investigate whether the relationship between rm survival and nancial
development has been inuenced by the recent East Asian eorts to strengthen their legal
and nancial systems and building secondary-market infrastructure.
We should expect the creation of such pan-regional model to give boost to the integration
of national markets. This will make investors more willing to participate in a security market
that represents claims on a basket of regional bonds diversifying away idiosyncratic national
risk (Eichengreen (2004)). In addition, according to Borensztein et al. (2008) bond markets
grow together with the rest of the nancial system (banking system and stock markets) and
thus all markets will benet. In a context of a greater nancial development, we anticipate
the negative eect of banking development on survival to loose its relevance over time.
Similarly, we would expect that the impact of stock market development on rms' failures
to be more pronounced once the initiatives took place.15 In order to test this hypothesis,
we interact the indicators of nancial development with a time period dummy as follows:
FD*Late and FD*(1   Late), where Late takes the value one in years 2003 to 2007, and
zero for the years 1995 through 2002.16
15A similar exercise was carried out by Guariglia and Poncet (2008) in order to test for the evolution of
the nance-growth nexus in China.
16Our results were robust to dening the time period dummy Late equal to one in 2005 to 2007, in order
to capture the second phase of the Asian Bond Fund.
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Results for the evolution of nancial development over time are reported in Table 5. We
observe that the coecients onMarket Capitalization andMarket V alue Traded reported
in columns 1 and 2 are negative and highly signicant only for the late period (2003{07)
suggesting that stock market development is benecial to rms' survival once the regional
initiatives took place in 2003. To gauge the economic eect we consider the coecient
on market capitalization for the late period as shown in column 1 of Table 5. Moving
from the 25th percentile of the distribution of market capitalization (41.2%) to the 50th
percentile (88%) would result into 87 percentage points higher chance of survival during
the late period of our sample. The coecients for both indicators during the pre-2003
period are insignicant and quantitatively unimportant. These results lend support to our
hypothesis that the relationship between rm survival and stock market development has
been strengthened by the recent East Asian eorts to build secondary-market infrastructure.
Coming to our banking development indicators, column 3 shows that the estimated posi-
tive eect of Private Bank Credit on rms' chances of failing is conned only to the pre-2003
period. We observe a sign reversal for the later years of our sample, which suggests that
the adverse eect of banking development on rm survival has declined over time, hindering
rm survival to a lower extent. To assess the eect of private bank credit on rm survival
during the late period of our sample, we can focus on the coecient reported in column 3 of
Table 5. Increasing private bank credit from the 25th percentile (84%) to the 50th percentile
(101%) would increase rms' survival prospects by 18 percentage points. Column 4 shows
that the coecient on Bank Assets is negative and highly signicant for the later years of
our sample, while insignicant for the pre-2003 period. Finally, tests of equality reported at
the foot of Table 5 suggest signicant dierences between the interacted coecients. These
results conrm our hypothesis that the adverse eects of banking development indicators
became weaker during 2003-2007, which might reect the reforms in the nancial system
that reduced Asian banks' ineciencies.
4.3. The dierentiated eect of rm size
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In this sub-section we test whether all rm types are equally aected by nancial develop-
ment. We use rm size as a sorting device because small rms are more likely to be associated
with the higher degree of information asymmetry and therefore may nd it dicult to access
capital markets and benet when nancial development takes place. The importance of size
in rms' real activities was emphasized in the empirical nancing constraints literature. Size
was employed as a criterion by Guariglia (2008) and Spaliara (2009) and is the key proxy
for capital market access by manufacturing rms in Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) because
small rms are more vulnerable to capital market imperfections and thus more likely to be
nancially constrained. In addition, there is evidence that the nexus between growth and
nancial development is related to rm size. Beck et al. (2005) nd that the nancial sys-
tem aects the growth of small rms more severely across a wide set of both developed and
developing economies. Consistent with this view, Guiso et al. (2004) show that nancial
development fosters the growth of small rms more than large rms in Italy.
Given that our objective is to verify whether there is a dierential eect of nancial
development on the failure probabilities of small and large rms, we interact our nancial
development indicators as follows: FD*Small and FD*(1   Small), where Small is a
dummy variable equal to one if the rm's real total assets are below the upper quartile of
the distribution of the assets of all the rms in that particular industry and year, and zero
otherwise. This exercise is based on the consideration that small rms tend to face greater
asymmetric information problems and have therefore smaller chances of survival, as nancing
constraints become binding. Large rms, on the other hand, are likely to be less nancially
constrained and will be better equipped to take advantage of the development of the nancial
system. If this hypothesis were true, when banking development takes place, which was found
to increase the incidence of rm failure, we should expect small rms to be more severely
aected than large rms. On the other hand, in a market-based system, which is associated
with a decrease in rm failures, we should expect improvements in nancial services (in
terms of size or liquidity of the stock market) to disproportionately help large rms. This is
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because large rms can access capital markets, while signicant xed costs may prevent small
rms from accessing capital markets (Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990)). Therefore, when
considering the banking system development we expect to nd weaker eect on large rms'
probabilities of failure: the coecients associated with FD*(1   Small) should be smaller
than those associated with FD*Small. The exact opposite pattern should be observed when
stock market development takes place: the coecients associated with FD*(1   Small)
should be larger than those associated with FD*Small.
Table 6 reports the estimated coecients on the interacted nancial system characteristics
as well as our control variables. The results show that both Market Capitalization and
Market V alue Traded (columns 1 and 2) are signicant only for large rms, which do not
face binding nancing constraints and they are able to tap the capital markets, while they are
insignicant for small rms. Tests of equality suggest that the coecients are signicantly
dierent from each other in one out of two cases. To ascertain the economic eect, consider
the coecient on market capitalization for large rms, as shown in column 1 of Table 6.
Moving from the 25th percentile of the distribution of market capitalization (41.2%) to the
50th percentile (88%) would increase large rms' survival chances by 61 percentage points.
This result conrms our hypothesis that greater development in stock markets, both in terms
of size and liquidity, shields only large rms against failures since they nd it easier to access
stock markets due to smaller information and transaction costs. Therefore, stock market
development is particularly benecial to large rms.
The coecients on the banking development as shown in columns 3 and 4 are signicant
for both types of rms. We nd that at higher levels of banking development (measured by
Private Bank Credit and Bank Assets respectively) both small and large rms' survival
prospects are adversely aected but the coecients on small rms are two times larger that of
large rms. In addition, for both indicators these coecients are signicantly dierent from
each other (p-values are 0.00 in both cases). To see the economic magnitude, consider the
case of private bank credit. Bringing up private bank credit from the 25th percentile (84%)
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to the 50th percentile (101%), the coecient estimates in column 3 of table 6 indicate that
small (large) rms' failing chances would increase by 20 (13) percentage points. This nding
lends support to the story that higher levels of banking intermediation aect dierently
rms' survival prospects, with bank-dependent small rms being the most aected.
5. Robustness tests
In this section we subject our a ndings to a number of tests to ensure robustness. These
additional checks involve estimation of our empirical models with random-eects Probit
and IV Probit, considering whether the eects of nancial development dier during and
outside the Asian crisis as well as between market-based and bank-oriented economies, using
alternative cut-o points for the denition of small and large rms, and employing additional
measures of nancing constraints.
5.1. Alternative estimation methods
While the complementary log-log model captures the exact time of failure it does not take
into account the panel nature of the dataset nor does it control for the potential endogeneity
of our regressors. In order to address these potential concerns we take two steps. First,
we verify whether our results are robust to using a random-eects Probit estimator which
explicitly controls for unobserved heterogeneity. Second, we employ IV Probit techniques,
which allow the rm-specic variables to be endogenous and then instrumenting for them
through a two-stage procedure. Leverage, protability, collateral, size and size squared are
instrumented using their lagged levels in t-1. In addition, when we partition our sample
to small and large rms our instruments set includes leverage, protability, collateral, size,
size squared and the interactions of the indicators of nancial development with the dummy
variable Small all lagged once. Since we are using IV estimators we check for the validity of
the instruments using a Sargan test statistic of the overidentifying restrictions, reported at
the foot of the table of results. In all cases the Sargan test conrms that the instrumental
variables used in our empirical models are valid.
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The results for the baseline model (shown in Table 4) are reported in Table 7. Results
from the random-eects Probit models are reported in columns 1 to 4, while results from the
IV Probit models are shown in columns 5 to 8. We observe that in most cases the presented
pattern of nancial development indicators conrms our main ndings and all our control
variables retain their signs and signicance. Specically, in Table 7 we continue to observe
that stock market development would directly reduce rms' failure prospects, while higher
levels of nancial intermediary development would increase rms' chances of failing. We
have also used random-eects Probit and IV Probit methods for partitioning our sample into
dierent time periods and rm classes. The results of these robustness tests are summarized
below, but not reported-they are available from the author upon request. We nd that the
positive eects of stock market development on rm survival are more pronounced during
the later period of our sample, while the adverse eects of banking development have been
reduced over time. Furthermore, we nd that large rms are more likely to benet from
developments in nancial markets compared to small rms. Finally, bank-dependent small
rms are adversely aected at higher levels of nancial intermediation. We therefore conclude
that our main ndings are not driven by unobserved heterogeneity not accounted for in the
complementary log log models. In addition, we show that the extent of endogeneity bias is
very limited in our sample and our ndings are robust to an instrumental variables technique.
5.2. The Asian crisis
Our empirical specications consider whether the eects of nancial development on rm
survival have changed over time by partitioning our sample into pre- and post-2003, but do
not consider whether these eects vary with the state of the economy. Our sample covers the
Asian crisis and this would provide a natural experiment to compare the impact of nancial
development on rm survival in and out of the crisis. Therefore, we construct the dummy
variable Crisis that takes the value one in years 1997 and 1998, and zero otherwise. We aim
to capture the fact that the second half of 1997 saw the unprecedented collapse of the stock
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markets and currencies of several Asian countries. There is evidence that the Asian crisis
adversely inuenced the ability of rms to access credit on international markets through
sudden stops of capital inows (see Calvo (1999)).
To understand whether the eects of nancial development on rms' survival chances were
dierent during and outside the Asian crisis we interact the indicators of nancial develop-
ment with the Crisis and 1 Crisis terms. This test is a modication of estimated models
in Table 5 and results are reported in Table 8. We observe that the coecients on stock
market development indicators are negative and signicant outside the Asian crisis which
suggests that developments in the stock market would increase rms' survival prospects dur-
ing tranquil periods. This nding may be explained by the fact that stock market eciency
varies with the level of equity development (see Kim and Shamsuddin (2008)) and during
the 1997-98 crisis most Asian stock markets were characterized as inecient. The results for
the crisis period are less clear cut. We nd that larger stock markets would not inuence
rms' chances of survival during adverse economic events, while only market value traded
is signicant during the crisis. Once again, p-values of the tests of equality show signicant
dierences among the interacted terms. On the contrary, we observe a positive association
between rms' survival chances and banking development indicators both in and out of the
crisis. The coecients, however, on the indicators of banking development during the crisis
are almost three times larger compared with those outside the crisis. In addition, they are
signicantly dierent from each other (p-values are 0.00 for both cases). This result implies
that the adverse eects of banking intermediation on rm survival are stronger during bad
economic times and conrms Beck et al. (2006) who show that monetary shocks are mag-
nied by the existence of signicant nancial intermediation. On the whole, our ndings
suggest that the benecial eects of stock market development on rm survival are stronger
during tranquil periods, while the adverse eects of banking development are more potent
during extreme economic conditions.
5.3. Financial architecture
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While most emerging Asian economies are thought to be mainly bank-based, we noted
earlier in the paper that there is substantial heterogeneity in nancial development of the
ve economies used in this study. In addition, Kim and Shamsuddin (2008) use the level of
equity market development, which is measured by the FTSE classication of equity markets,
to categorize Korea and Singapore into the `advanced' or `developed' group of emerging
economies and Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand into the `secondary' emerging markets
group. In our context economies with higher levels of equity market development are more
likely to be market-based, while those with lower levels of equity market development are
more likely to be bank-based. Thus, Korea and Singapore can be considered as market-based
systems compared to Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand which can be characterized as bank-
based systems. Accordingly, we dene the dummy variableMarket based that takes the value
one for Korea and Singapore, and zero for Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. Our baseline
models presented in Table 4 do not distinguish the eects of nancial development between
bank-oriented and market-based systems and in this exercise we interact the indicators of
nancial development with the Market based and 1-Market based terms. We therefore
attempt to check whether the eects of nancial development on rms' survival prospects
dier across these two groups of countries.
We report results of this exercise in Table 9. We nd that all four indicators of nancial
development are negative and highly signicant for the group of market-based economies
(Korea and Singapore). As we would expect larger and more liquid stock markets would
increase rms' survival prospects in economies which stock markets have a comparative
advantage in performing important functions such as capital formation, risk sharing and
information production. In addition, higher levels of nancial intermediation can increase
rms' survival chances since rms in economies with developed nancial markets are able to
access alternative sources of nance and therefore can obtain external funding at a reasonable
cost. Moving to the group of bank-centered economies (Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand)
we do not nd a signicant eect of stock market development on rms' survival prospects,
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but we do nd that more nancial intermediation would increase rm failures in economies
with less developed stock exchanges. This nding is in line with Beck et al. (2006) who
argue that in these economies banks cannot easily substitute deposits for other sources of
nance and rms are mainly bank dependent without having access to alternative sources of
funding. Finally, the tests of equality show that the interacted coecients display signicant
dierences in all cases.
5.4. Alternative cut-o points
In our main empirical results, we used the 75th percentile as a cut-o value for small
and large rms. In order to ensure that our results are not driven from the way that we
divide our sample, we use the 50th percentile as an alternative cut-o point. Specically,
we classify small rms as those whose total assets are below the median of the distribution
of the assets of all the rms in that particular industry and year, and zero otherwise. We
then re-estimate the models from Table 6 and report the results in Table 10. We nd that
large rms show the same sensitivity to stock market development, while small rms remain
unaected (p-values are 0.00 for both cases). In addition, we continue to observe that the
coecients on the private banking development are signicant for both types of rms, but
with signicantly higher values for small rms (p-value is 0.01). The coecients on the bank
assets are signicant for both small and large rms with signicantly larger eects for the
former category (p-value is 0.04). In summary, we can conclude that our main empirical
results are robust to alternative cut-o values.
5.5. Additional proxies for nancing constraints
Thus far we have examined whether there is a dierential eect of nancial development
indicators on the failure probabilities of small and large rms. This classication is related to
the well established empirical nancing constraints literature (see for example Fazzari et al.
(1988) and the discussion in Brown and Petersen (2009) and Chae et al. (2009)). Therefore,
we now check whether other proxies for nancing constraints can be used for robustness.
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First, we rely on rms' bank dependency, as measured by the ratio of short term debt to
total debt.17 Second, we employ an indicator of rms' riskiness, as measured by the Z-score.18
Specically, we create a dummy variable BankDep, which is equal to one if the rm's ratio
of short term debt to total debt is above the bottom quartile of the distribution of the short
term debt to total debt ratio of all the rms in that particular industry and year, and zero
otherwise. In addition, we generate a dummy variable Risky, which is equal to one if the
rm's Z-score is below the upper quartile of the distribution of the Z-score of all the rms
in that particular industry and year, and zero otherwise.
We re-estimate the models from Table 6 and report the results in Tables 11 and 12.
We nd that the coecients on the stock market development indicators are negative and
signicant for rms more likely to be unconstrained (less bank dependent and safe), while
insignicant for their constrained counterparts (with the only exception being risky rms).
Thus, we continue to observe that unconstrained rms are more likely to benet from de-
velopments in the stock markets. Moving to the indicators of banking development, we
nd that the coecients on the private bank credit and bank assets are signicant for both
types of rms, but with signicantly higher values for constrained rms.19 Therefore, bank
dependent and risky rms are more likely to be adversely aected by increased banking
intermediation and this conrms our main ndings.
6. Conclusions
Using a panel for ve Asian economies - Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and
Thailand - we nd that country-level indicators of nancial development have an important
17It is generally accepted that higher levels of bank dependency are associated with rms which are more
likely to be nancially constrained (see Spaliara (2009)).
18Following Altman (1968) the Z-score is calculated as follows: Z-score = 0.012*X1 + 0.014*X2 + 0.033*X3
+ 0.006*X4 + 0.999*X5, where X1 is the ratio of working capital to total assets, X2 is the ratio of retained
earnings to total assets, X3 is the ratio of earnings before interest and tax to total assets, X4 denotes the
ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of total debt, and X5 is the share of sales in total assets.
The higher the Z-score the less risky a rm can be considered. Therefore, risky rms are more likely to be
characterized by nancing constraints (see Guariglia and Mateut (2010)).
19P-values for tests of equality of the coecients are as follows: 0.19 and 0.09 when we use the bank
dependency as sorting device and 0.00 for both cases when we use the Z-score as sorting device.
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role to play in inuencing rm survival. When stock markets develop, both in terms of
size and liquidity, rms' survival chances improve. In other words, moving towards a more
market-based system is likely to reduce the incidence of business failures. On the contrary,
we show that greater banking intermediation can increase rm failures and we argue that
bank-based systems in emerging Asian markets are inherent to bank runs and therefore could
impede rms' survival prospects.
When we consider whether the linkage between survival and nancial development has
evolved over time, we nd that the benecial eects of stock market development are more
pronounced during the later years of our sample, while the adverse eects of bank inter-
mediation have declined over time. Finally, after separating rms into dierent categories
using their size as sorting device we nd that large rms would benet the most from devel-
opments in the stock market, while small rms are most severely aected from high levels
of nancial intermediation. This implies that not all rms are equally aected by nancial
development, reecting the higher risk characteristics associated with small rms that are
nancially constrained and subject to greater information asymmetries. These results were
robust to using an instrumental variables technique, to controlling for unobserved hetero-
geneity, to using alternative cut-o points for the denition of small and large rms and to
including additional proxies for nancing constraints. In addition, our results suggest that
the main eects of nancial indicators on rm survival chances dier during and outside the
Asian crisis, and for bank- and market-based countries.
Our results provide new evidence that the development of the nancial system along
with rms' nancial condition can play a key role in determining corporate failures. De-
veloping better equity and bond markets may help to avoid excessive dependence on bank
intermediation and the problem of sudden stops and creditor runs, which are an inherent
feature of short-term credit markets. Thus less reliance on banks means a correspondingly
lower exposure to banking crises. It is important to note that Asian economies would benet
from better diversied nancial systems in which well developed stock and bond markets
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would complement their banking systems. Asian policy makers should therefore promote the
development of a sound banking system and well-functioning nancial markets at the same
time in order to facilitate the development of a balanced economy and to improve rms'
performance and survival prospects.
7 Appendix
7.1 Structure of the panels
Number of obs. per rm Number of observations
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Singapore Thailand
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
2 10 24 6 15 29
3 65 77 20 40 90
4 68 189 50 41 112
5 40 331 107 99 111
6 58 512 142 101 93
7 89 424 175 116 139
8 114 488 293 178 102
9 161 653 201 283 110
10 180 215 173 222 90
11 189 405 404 367 99
12 924 745 1131 454 230
13 807 1548 4299 2040 3126
Total 2705 5611 7001 3956 4333
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Table 1: Summary statistics for rm-specic variables used in the empirical models
All rms Fail=1 Fail=0 Di.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Leverage 0.63 0.92 0.61 0.000
(0.81) (1.15) (0.76)
Profitability 7.62 -8.91 9.36 0.000
(50.62) (64.42) (68.42)
Collateral 0.72 0.59 0.73 0.000
(0.30) (0.37) (0.28)
Size 14.04 14.01 14.38 0.000
(3.44) (3.38) ( 3.44)
Age 14.25 12.88 14.39 0.000
(4.94) (5.06) (4.91)
Observations 23,606 2,247 21,359
Notes: The table presents sample means. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. The p-value of a test of the equality
of means is reported. Fail is a dummy that equals 1 if the rm fails, and 0 otherwise. Leverage is measured as the rm's
total debt to assets ratio. Profitability is the ratio of the rm's prots before interest and tax to its total assets. Collateral
is dened as the ratio of the rm's tangible assets over its total assets. Size is denoted by the log of real assets. Age measures
the number of years a rm has been listed on the stock exchange. The time period is 1995-2007. Variables are measured in
thousands of US dollars.
Table 2: Summary statistics for rm-specic variables by country
Leverage Protability Collateral Size Age Observations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Indonesia 0.72 4.87 0.71 18.9 15.33 2705
(0.63) (30.20) (0.33) (2.15) (4.87)
Korea 0.56 6.35 0.78 18.61 10.96 5611
(0.49) (25.11) (0.27) (1.63) (4.48)
Malaysia 0.51 7.42 0.67 12.09 15.53 7001
(0.48) (31.50) (0.25) (1.66) (4.35)
Singapore 0.48 10.11 0.74 11.29 14.87 3956
(0.47) (31.07) (0.29) (1.90) (5.27)
Thailand 0.61 5.77 0.69 14.45 15.78 4333
(0.58) (27.55) (0.34) (1.78) (3.96)
Notes: The table presents sample means. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. Leverage is measured as the rm's
total debt to assets ratio. Profitability is the ratio of the rm's prots before interest and tax to its total assets. Collateral
is dened as the ratio of the rm's tangible assets over its total assets. Size is denoted by the log of real assets. Age measures
the number of years a rm has been listed on the stock exchange. The time period is 1995-2007. Variables are measured in
thousands of US dollars.
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Table 3: Summary statistics for development indicators and failure rates by country
Market Capitalization Market Value Traded Private Bank Credit Bank Assets Failure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Indonesia 0.25 0.10 0.31 0.42 0.09
(0.06) (0.04) (0.15) (0.08) (0.29)
Korea 0.58 1.36 0.82 0.85 0.09
(0.23) (0.52) (0.14) (0.17) (0.28)
Malaysia 1.62 0.66 1.31 1.32 0.10
(0.39) (0.42) (0.23) (0.15) (0.30)
Singapore 1.62 0.98 1.02 1.21 0.06
(0.18) (0.48) (0.10) (0.12) (0.25)
Thailand 0.53 0.37 1.14 1.26 0.15
(0.18) (0.16) (0.27) (0.24) (0.36)
Notes: The table presents sample means. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. Market Capitalization is dened
as the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP. Market V alue Traded is measured as the ratio of total stock market value
traded to GDP. Private Bank Credit is given by the ratio of private bank credit to GDP. Bank Assets is calculated as the
ratio of deposit-money bank domestic assets to GDP. Failure is the average rate of failure at the rm-level.
Figure 1: Comparing our data with a broader aggregate
1
5
0
0
2
0
0
0
2
5
0
0
3
0
0
0
3
5
0
0
4
0
0
0
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
Year
WDI Our sample
Number of listed companies
31
Table 4: Financial development and rm survival
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Market Capitalization -0.238**
(-1.96)
Market V alue Traded -0.319***
(-4.42)
Private Bank Credit 1.094***
(11.99)
Bank Assets 1.007***
(6.92)
Leverage 0.250*** 0.250*** 0.257*** 0.258***
(13.72) (13.71) (13.85) (13.98)
Profitability -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003***
(-9.73) (-9.76) (-9.55) (-9.39)
Collateral -0.675*** -0.675*** -0.644*** -0.654***
(-8.87) (-8.86) (-8.41) (-8.57)
Size -0.095 -0.094 -0.103 -0.108*
(-1.49) (-1.46) (-1.63) (-1.70)
Size2 0.004** 0.004** 0.005** 0.005**
(2.10) (2.06) (2.43) (2.47)
Age -0.138*** -0.138*** -0.127*** -0.131***
(-6.73) (-6.73) (-6.18) (-6.39)
Age2 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002** 0.002**
(2.72) (2.73) (2.25) (2.41)
GDP -0.027*** -0.021*** -0.015*** -0.009
(-5.00) (-3.99) (-2.93) (-1.45)
MES -0.014 -0.015 -0.013 -0.010
(-0.06) (-0.06) (-0.05) (-0.04)
Observations 23606 23606 23606 23606
Log   likelihood -6591 -6580 -6528 -6566
Notes: Proportional hazard model results are reported. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the rm fails, and
zero otherwise. All rm-specic variables are lagged one period. Robust z-statistics are presented in the parentheses. The
following countries are included in the regressions: Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. * signicant at 10%;
** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%. Country dummies and industry dummies are included in the models. Also see notes
to Table 1.
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Table 5: Evolution over time
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Market Capitalization*Late -1.162***
(-12.43)
Market Capitalization*(1  Late) 0.057
(0.64)
Market V alue Traded*Late -1.559***
(-15.59)
Market V alue Traded*(1  Late) 0.033
(0.53)
Private Bank Credit*Late -1.018***
(-8.19)
Private Bank Credit*(1  Late) 0.338***
(3.46)
Bank Assets*Late -1.304***
(-8.21)
Bank Assets*(1  Late) -0.001
(-0.01)
Leverage 0.229*** 0.221*** 0.225*** 0.223***
(11.57) (11.23) (11.28) (11.10)
Profitability -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004***
(-9.12) (-9.47) (-9.10) (-9.09)
Collateral -0.737*** -0.749*** -0.719*** -0.728***
(-9.36) (-9.55) (-9.12) (-9.24)
Size -0.041 0.011 -0.026 -0.024
(-0.64) (0.17) (-0.40) (-0.36)
Size2 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.002
(1.15) (0.04) (0.85) (0.77)
Age -0.125*** -0.127*** -0.121*** -0.123***
(-6.15) (-6.27) (-5.95) (-6.07)
Age2 0.002** 0.002** 0.002* 0.002**
(2.11) (2.27) (1.96) (2.05)
GDP -0.008 -0.012** -0.002 -0.004
(-1.58) (-2.37) (-0.52) (-0.88)
MES -0.077 -0.083 -0.076 -0.078
(-0.31) (-0.33) (-0.31) (-0.31)
Observations 23606 23606 23606 23606
Log   likelihood -6238 -6207 -6206 -6208
Test of equality (p-value): Market Capitalization 0.00
Test of equality (p-value): Market V alue Traded 0.00
Test of equality (p-value): Private Bank Credit 0.00
Test of equality (p-value): Bank Assets 0.00
Notes: Proportional hazard model results are reported. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the rm fails, and
zero otherwise. Late is a time period dummy that takes the value one in years 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007, and zero for
the years 1995 to 2002. All rm-specic variables are lagged one period. Robust z-statistics are presented in the parentheses.
The test of equality is reported as a chi-squared statistic. The following countries are included in the regressions: Indonesia,
Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%. Country dummies
and industry dummies are included in the models. Also see notes to Table 1.
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Table 6: The dierentiated eect of rm size
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Market Capitalization*Small -0.145
(-1.20)
Market Capitalization*(1  Small) -0.819***
(-4.52)
Market V alue Traded*Small -0.060
(-0.81)
Market V alue Traded*(1  Small) -0.173*
(-1.75)
Private Bank Credit*Small 1.131***
(12.50)
Private Bank Credit*(1  Small) 0.743***
(5.26)
Bank Assets*Small 1.085***
(7.48)
Bank Assets*(1  Small) 0.683***
(3.92)
Leverage 0.250*** 0.256*** 0.257*** 0.258***
(13.63) (12.05) (13.80) (13.92)
Profitability -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003***
(-9.86) (-10.94) (-9.56) (-9.38)
Collateral -0.652*** -0.538*** -0.630*** -0.639***
(-8.55) (-6.05) (-8.23) (-8.37)
Size -0.202*** -0.093 -0.209*** -0.225***
(-2.90) (-1.16) (-2.92) (-3.13)
Size2 0.009*** 0.005* 0.009*** 0.010***
(3.70) (1.78) (3.80) (4.00)
Age -0.136*** -0.130*** -0.124*** -0.127***
(-6.62) (-5.44) (-6.02) (-6.21)
Age2 0.002*** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002**
(2.64) (2.00) (2.11) (2.27)
GDP -0.027*** -0.054*** -0.015*** -0.008
(-5.06) (-11.10) (-2.95) (-1.25)
MES -0.054 -0.206 -0.054 -0.054
(-0.22) (-0.70) (-0.22) (-0.22)
Observations 23606 23606 23606 23606
Log   likelihood -6580 -6570 -6521 -6558
Test of equality (p-value): Market Capitalization 0.00
Test of equality (p-value): Market V alue Traded 0.21
Test of equality (p-value): Private Bank Credit 0.00
Test of equality (p-value): Bank Assets 0.00
Notes: Proportional hazard model results are reported. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the rm fails,
and zero otherwise. Small is a dummy variable equal to one if the rm's real total assets are below the upper quartile of the
distribution of the assets of all the rms in that particular industry and year, and zero otherwise. All rm-specic variables
are lagged one period. Robust z-statistics are presented in the parentheses. The test of equality is reported as a chi-squared
statistic. The following countries are included in the regressions: Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. *
signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%. Country dummies and industry dummies are included in the
models. Also see notes to Table 1.
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Table 7: Robustness: alternative estimation methods for the baseline models
R-E R-E R-E R-E IV IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Market Capitalization -0.517** -0.078
(-2.25) (-1.55)
Market V alue Traded -0.494*** -0.124***
(-3.61) (-3.90)
Private Bank Credit 0.814*** 0.584***
(3.57) (10.38)
Bank Assets 0.802* 0.459***
(1.89) (5.85)
Leverage 0.229*** 0.229*** 0.238*** 0.235*** 0.194*** 0.194*** 0.199*** 0.200***
(4.76) (4.72) (5.03) (4.87) (11.56) (11.54) (11.82) (11.89)
Profitability -0.002* -0.002* -0.002** -0.001* -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005***
(-1.81) (-1.91) (-2.07) (-1.82) (-10.17) (-10.16) (-10.28) (-10.11)
Collateral -0.866*** -0.866*** -0.828*** -0.831*** -0.346*** -0.347*** -0.336*** -0.341***
(-4.58) (-4.61) (-4.40) (-4.32) (-7.13) (-7.14) (-6.89) (-7.01)
Size -0.176 -0.187 -0.193 -0.214 -0.083** -0.082** -0.092*** -0.091**
(-1.14) (-1.24) (-1.36) (-1.39) (-2.33) (-2.32) (-2.60) (-2.58)
Size2 0.010** 0.011** 0.011** 0.012** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(2.05) (2.24) (2.38) (2.33) (3.05) (3.02) (3.51) (3.44)
Age -0.181*** -0.174*** -0.162*** -0.170*** -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.049*** -0.050***
(-3.72) (-3.57) (-3.48) (-3.46) (-8.74) (-8.75) (-8.40) (-8.53)
Age2 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 0.0009** 0.0001** 0.0002** 0.0001**
(2.25) (2.09) (1.99) (2.02) (2.19) (2.22) (2.06) (2.11)
GDP 0.001 0.004 -0.002 0.004 -0.009*** -0.006* -0.004 -0.001
(0.06) (0.34) (-0.19) (0.27) (-2.87) (-1.91) (-1.24) (-0.46)
MES 0.346 0.115 0.044 -0.024 -0.350*** -0.350*** -0.347*** -0.348***
(0.53) (0.14) (0.07) (-0.03) (-7.21) (-7.21) (-7.15) (-7.17)
Observations 23606 23606 23606 23606 23558 23558 23558 23558
Sargan(p  value) - - - - 0.71 0.89 0.92 0.94
Log   likelihood -1546 -1548 -1539 -1550 -6569 -6561 -6508 -6548
Notes: Random-eect Probit regression results are reported in columns 1 to 4. IV Probit regression results are reported in
columns 5 to 8. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the rm fails, and zero otherwise. In the IV Probit
regressions leverage, protability, collateral, size and size squared are instrumented using their lagged levels in t-1. Robust
z-statistics are presented in the parentheses. The Sargan statistic is a test of the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as
chi-square under the null of instrument validity. The following countries are included in the regressions: Indonesia, Korea,
Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%. Country dummies and
industry dummies are included in the models. Also see notes to Table 1.
35
Table 8: Robustness: the Asian crisis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Market Capitalization*Crisis 0.070
(0.60)
Market Capitalization*(1  Crisis) -0.574***
(-4.34)
Market V alue Traded*Crisis 0.471***
(6.85)
Market V alue Traded*(1  Crisis) -0.558***
(-8.16)
Private Bank Credit*Crisis 0.783***
(8.36)
Private Bank Credit*(1  Crisis) 0.264*
(1.90)
Bank Assets*Crisis 1.129***
(8.17)
Bank Assets*(1  Crisis) 0.409***
(2.67)
Leverage 0.245*** 0.242*** 0.251*** 0.251***
(13.28) (13.17) (13.64) (13.55)
Profitability -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004***
(-10.50) (-10.68) (-10.62) (-10.63)
Collateral -0.673*** -0.665*** -0.636*** -0.631***
(-8.80) (-8.68) (-8.30) (-8.22)
Size -0.085 -0.071 -0.086 -0.088
(-1.33) (-1.10) (-1.35) (-1.39)
Size2 0.004* 0.003* 0.004** 0.004**
(1.95) (1.67) (2.08) (2.13)
Age -0.134*** -0.135*** -0.126*** -0.124***
(-6.52) (-6.56) (-6.08) (-5.98)
Age2 0.002** 0.002*** 0.002** 0.002**
(2.53) (2.58) (2.17) (2.10)
GDP 0.004 0.002 0.012** 0.041***
(0.65) (0.32) (2.04) (5.90)
MES -0.031 -0.033 -0.027 -0.029
(-0.13) (-0.13) (-0.11) (-0.12)
Observations 23606 23606 23606 23606
Log   likelihood -6509 -6485 -6489 -6471
Test of equality (p-value): Market Capitalization 0.00
Test of equality (p-value): Market V alue Traded 0.00
Test of equality (p-value): Private Bank Credit 0.00
Test of equality (p-value): Bank Assets 0.00
Notes: Proportional hazard model results are reported. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the rm fails,
and zero otherwise. Crisis is a time period dummy that takes the value one in years 1997 and 1998, and zero otherwise.
All rm-specic variables are lagged one period. Robust z-statistics are presented in the parentheses. The test of equality
is reported as a chi-squared statistic. The following countries are included in the regressions: Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia,
Singapore and Thailand. * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%. Country dummies and industry
dummies are included in the models. Also see notes to Table 1.
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Table 9: Robustness: nancial architecture
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Market Capitalization*Market based -2.077***
(-13.31)
Market Capitalization*(1-Market based) 0.065
(0.35)
Market V alue Traded*Market based -0.712***
(-9.15)
Market V alue Traded*(1-Market based) 0.037
(0.91)
Private Bank Credit*Market based -3.930***
(-15.89)
Private Bank Credit*(1-Market based) 1.712***
(20.52)
Bank Assets*Market based -4.047***
(-18.45)
Bank Assets*(1-Market based) 3.173***
(19.54)
Leverage 0.242*** 0.243*** 0.221*** 0.218***
(13.06) (13.16) (11.58) (11.14)
Profitability -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004***
(-10.09) (-10.32) (-10.17) (-9.08)
Collateral -0.684*** -0.675*** -0.641*** -0.651***
(-8.91) (-8.84) (-8.27) (-8.31)
Size -0.043 -0.070 -0.031 -0.037
(-0.66) (-1.09) (-0.48) (-0.57)
Size2 0.002 0.003* 0.002 0.002
(1.12) (1.65) (0.87) (0.91)
Age -0.135*** -0.139*** -0.120*** -0.119***
(-6.55) (-6.74) (-5.83) (-5.81)
Age2 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002* 0.002*
(2.58) (2.72) (1.95) (1.95)
GDP -0.031*** -0.028*** -0.007 0.031***
(-5.78) (-5.36) (-1.53) (5.33)
MES -0.051 -0.035 -0.056 -0.061
(-0.20) (-0.14) (-0.22) (-0.24)
Observations 23606 23606 23606 23606
Log   likelihood -6474 -6530 -6324 -6243
Test of equality (p-value): Market Capitalization 0.00
Test of equality (p-value): Market V alue Traded 0.00
Test of equality (p-value): Private Bank Credit 0.00
Test of equality (p-value): Bank Assets 0.00
Notes: Proportional hazard model results are reported. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the rm fails, and
zero otherwise. Market based is a dummy variable that takes the value one for Korea and Singapore, and zero for Indonesia,
Malaysia and Thailand. All rm-specic variables are lagged one period. Robust z-statistics are presented in the parentheses.
The test of equality is reported as a chi-squared statistic. The following countries are included in the regressions: Indonesia,
Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%. Country dummies
and industry dummies are included in the models. Also see notes to Table 1.
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Table 10: Robustness: alternative cut-o points
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Market Capitalization*Small -0.130
(-1.03)
Market Capitalization*(1  Small) -0.363***
(-2.94)
Market V alue Traded*Small 0.119
(1.34)
Market V alue Traded*(1  Small) -0.268***
(-3.06)
Private Bank Credit*Small 1.173***
(12.37)
Private Bank Credit*(1  Small) 1.023***
(10.68)
Bank Assets*Small 1.099***
(7.33)
Bank Assets*(1  Small) 0.980***
(6.68)
Leverage 0.254*** 0.253*** 0.261*** 0.261***
(13.82) (11.78) (13.83) (13.96)
Profitability -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.003***
(-9.73) (-11.25) (-9.47) (-9.32)
Collateral -0.713*** -0.580*** -0.675*** -0.678***
(-9.39) (-6.54) (-8.69) (-8.77)
Size -0.014 0.018 -0.052 -0.067
(-0.19) (0.23) (-0.76) (-0.99)
Size2 0.002 0.002 0.004* 0.004**
(1.14) (0.68) (1.90) (2.05)
Age -0.139*** -0.129*** -0.125*** -0.129***
(-6.81) (-5.43) (-6.11) (-6.34)
Age2 0.002*** 0.002* 0.002** 0.002**
(2.76) (1.95) (2.17) (2.36)
GDP -0.027*** -0.051*** -0.015*** -0.008
(-5.10) (-10.29) (-2.97) (-1.31)
MES -0.052 -0.238 -0.049 -0.039
(-0.21) (-0.81) (-0.20) (-0.15)
Observations 23606 23606 23606 23606
Log   likelihood -6585 -5273 -6525 -6564
Test of equality (p-value): Market Capitalization 0.00
Test of equality (p-value): Market V alue Traded 0.00
Test of equality (p-value): Private Bank Credit 0.01
Test of equality (p-value): Bank Assets 0.04
Notes: Proportional hazard model results are reported. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the rm fails, and
zero otherwise. Small is a dummy variable equal to one if the rm's real total assets are below the median of the distribution
of the assets of all the rms in that particular industry and year, and zero otherwise. All rm-specic variables are lagged one
period. Robust z-statistics are presented in the parentheses. The test of equality is reported as a chi-squared statistic. The
following countries are included in the regressions: Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. * signicant at 10%;
** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%. Country dummies and industry dummies are included in the models. Also see notes
to Table 1.
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Table 11: Robustness: bank dependency as an alternative proxy for nancing constraints
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Market Capitalization*BankDep -0.137
(-1.07)
Market Capitalization*(1 BankDep) -0.229*
(-1.72)
Market V alue Traded*BankDep -0.088
(-1.04)
Market V alue Traded*(1 BankDep) -0.192**
(-2.49)
Private Bank Credit*BankDep 0.927***
(11.52)
Private Bank Credit*(1 BankDep) 0.854***
(7.79)
Bank Assets*BankDep 0.704***
(4.41)
Bank Assets*(1 BankDep) 0.643***
(3.96)
Leverage 0.294*** 0.293*** 0.300*** 0.300***
(14.85) (14.72) (14.92) (14.97)
Profitability -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003***
(-7.88) (-7.78) (-7.75) (-7.66)
Collateral -0.368*** -0.379*** -0.365*** -0.369***
(-3.94) (-4.10) (-3.90) (-3.96)
Size 0.005 -0.021 -0.004 -0.008
(0.07) (-0.29) (-0.06) (-0.11)
Size2 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
(1.11) (1.38) (1.39) (1.39)
Age -0.031 -0.029 -0.028 -0.029
(-1.23) (-1.16) (-1.10) (-1.13)
Age2 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(-0.95) (-1.01) (-1.10) (-1.07)
GDP -0.024*** -0.021*** -0.017*** -0.013*
(-3.83) (-3.39) (-2.84) (-1.88)
MES -0.145 -0.134 -0.135 -0.134
(-0.56) (-0.52) (-0.53) (-0.52)
Observations 20607 20607 20607 20607
Log   likelihood -5705 -5703 -5669 -5696
Test of equality (p-value): Market Capitalization 0.07
Test of equality (p-value): Market V alue Traded 0.07
Test of equality (p-value): Private Bank Credit 0.09
Test of equality (p-value): Bank Assets 0.19
Notes: Proportional hazard model results are reported. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the rm fails, and
zero otherwise. BankDep is a dummy equal to one if the rm's ratio of short term debt to total debt is above the bottom
quartile of the distribution of the short term debt to total debt ratio of all the rms in that particular industry and year, and
zero otherwise. All rm-specic variables are lagged one period. Robust z-statistics are presented in the parentheses. The test
of equality is reported as a chi-squared statistic. The following countries are included in the regressions: Indonesia, Korea,
Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%. Country dummies and
industry dummies are included in the models. Also see notes to Table 1.
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Table 12: Robustness: Z-score as an alternative proxy for nancing constraints
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Market Capitalization*Risky -0.159
(-1.31)
Market Capitalization*(1 Risky) -0.427***
(-3.23)
Market V alue Traded*Risky -0.258***
(-3.51)
Market V alue Traded*(1 Risky) -0.520***
(-5.51)
Private Bank Credit*Risky 1.179***
(12.71)
Private Bank Credit*(1 Risky) 0.759***
(7.23)
Bank Assets*Risky 1.046***
(7.24)
Bank Assets*(1 Risky) 0.650***
(4.23)
Leverage 0.250*** 0.250*** 0.250*** 0.251***
(13.60) (13.67) (13.21) (13.37)
Profitability -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003***
(-8.68) (-8.94) (-7.98) (-7.85)
Collateral -0.653*** -0.663*** -0.601*** -0.618***
(-8.59) (-8.69) (-7.81) (-8.09)
Size -0.130** -0.097 -0.143** -0.143**
(-2.03) (-1.52) (-2.25) (-2.26)
Size2 0.005** 0.004* 0.005*** 0.005***
(2.44) (1.96) (2.65) (2.64)
Age -0.138*** -0.138*** -0.124*** -0.128***
(-6.72) (-6.74) (-6.05) (-6.26)
Age2 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002** 0.002**
(2.75) (2.75) (2.20) (2.37)
GDP -0.027*** -0.021*** -0.015*** -0.009
(-5.07) (-4.02) (-2.78) (-1.47)
MES 0.003 -0.003 0.018 0.021
(0.01) (-0.01) (0.07) (0.08)
Observations 23606 23606 23606 23606
Log   likelihood -6575 -6570 -6490 -6531
Test of equality (p-value): Market Capitalization 0.00
Test of equality (p-value): Market V alue Traded 0.00
Test of equality (p-value): Private Bank Credit 0.00
Test of equality (p-value): Bank Assets 0.00
Notes: Proportional hazard model results are reported. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the rm fails,
and zero otherwise. Risky is a dummy equal to one if the rm's Z-score falls below the upper quartile of the distribution of
the Z-score of all the rms in that particular industry and year, and zero otherwise. All rm-specic variables are lagged one
period. Robust z-statistics are presented in the parentheses. The test of equality is reported as a chi-squared statistic. The
following countries are included in the regressions: Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. * signicant at 10%;
** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%. Country dummies and industry dummies are included in the models. Also see notes
to Table 1.
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Figure 2: Evolution of development indicators
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